# Public Claim Amendment 4: Qualified Entry and Conditional Sufficiency

## Status

This amendment narrows and updates the Breakout Parity public claim after V10 qualified-entry, open-world, measurement-uncertainty, N-1, red-team, and saturation testing. It does not alter the July 26, 2026 concept-prior date for the original formulation.

## Superseded broad implication

The public record should not be read to imply that an integrated response architecture can reliably control proliferation after operational zero when strategically relevant programmes, material paths, suppliers, sanctuaries, or networks remain outside the baseline.

## Current defensible claim

Breakout Parity is a conditionally sufficient rolling-threat control architecture inside a qualified operating envelope. In the V10 model, it controls heterogeneous covered threats, decoys, open-world arrivals, sensor disruption, N-1 institutional failure, recurrence, and restoration behavior when all of the following are true:

1. No strategically relevant hidden holdout is known to remain outside the entry baseline.
2. Material, facility, supplier, sanctuary, and programme reset paths satisfy the declared coverage requirement.
3. Recertification uses adverse confidence bounds rather than central estimates.
4. Independently redundant sensing preserves the residual detection floor.
5. Physically evidenced custody or industrial barriers preserve sufficient time to act.
6. N-1 institutional capacity passes.
7. Response, rollback, assurance, and restoration meet the tested reliability envelope.
8. The portfolio remains below its certified saturation boundary.

Under the retained adverse-bound external validation, the controller passed all forty-eight modeled environments. Three previously difficult environments were rerun for 1,200 trajectories each and retained positive eleven-to-thirteen-month p10 margins. These are model results, not empirical estimates of current institutional capability.

## Failure boundary

The architecture fails when a hidden programme already exists outside the baseline or when transformative capability compresses the coercive-advantage clock beyond the maximum qualified sensing, custody, and response envelope. One hidden network holdout produced breach risk near forty-five to fifty-three percent across retained V10 cases.

## Recommended public acceptance condition

```text
adverse-bound p10 portfolio margin >= 6 months
probability of any breach <= 5%
restoration on time >= 95%
N-1 capacity passed
no known uncovered strategic holdout
```

This is a proposed research and qualification threshold. It is not a claim that existing institutions presently meet it.

## Programme consequence

A failed gate stops further reductions and activates hold-and-reinforce procedures. It does not automatically authorize preventive war, concealment of the failure, or a claim that operational zero remains stable.